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THE INTERRELATIONS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION 
AND SOCIETY 
HAROLD D. LASSWELLt 
THE nature and timing of world organization depend upon the 
global correlation of power with other elements in society.' If the 
rate of attempted organization outruns the growth of strong sustaining 
elements in world society, collapse will surely follow; and collapse will 
probably come after the political l6ite,2 fearful of secession and revolu- 
tion, creates a state which is not only a world garrison state, domi- 
nated by the military, but a world prison state dominated by the 
police. If, on the contrary, world organization lags behind the level 
which is capable of being attained by political skill at any particular 
time, humanity will remain under the shadow of atomic disaster.3 
t Professor of Law, Yale School of Law; recently director of War Communications 
Research in Washington, D. C.; advisory editor of Ethics and associate editor of the Public 
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1. That political institutions in any community are affected by, and in turn act upon, 
all other institutions is well established. An institution is a pattern of practices by which 
values are shaped and distributed. A practice includes operations (like voting) and per- 
spectives typically related to each operation (such as the doctrines, slogans, key symbols, 
and volitions connected with voting). Values are basic categories of desired events, like 
power, wealth and respect. On the interrelations of institutions, see for example: TIMA- 
SHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1939); EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1936); ROBSON, CIVILISATION AND THE GROWTH 
OF LAW (1935); COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924); RUSCHE and 
KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1939); RANULF, THE JEALOUSY OF 
THE GODS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW AT ATHENS (1934); ROUGIER, LES MYSTIQUES POLI- 
TIQUES CONTEMPORAINES ET LEURS INCIDENCES INTERNATIONALES (1935); MERRIAM, 
SYSTEMATIC POLITICS (1945); MACIVER, THE MODERN STATE (1926); MACLEOD, THE 
ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF POLITICS (1931); LLEWELLYN and HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: 
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941). 
2. Saint-Simon and other moderns have made descriptive use of the elite concept, 
meaning the parts of the social structure from which decision makers are drawn. See 
MoSCA, THE RULING CLASS (1939); PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY (1935); WEBER, 
WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (1925). 
3. On the military-police potentialities of modern times, see Lasswell, The Garrison 
State (1941) 46 AM. J. Soc. 455. Strictly speaking world organization is part of world so- 
ciety, and interacts continually with all institutions throughout the globe. In order to 
avoid the rather clumsy expression "and other institutions of society," the present article 
speaks of "world organization" and "society." It should also be noted that the term "world 
organization" is usually treated as synonymous with expressions like "world state," "world 
sovereign," "world body politic," "world government." We imply global control as well as 
authority, that is, a high level of effective as well as formal power. From a scientific point of 
view the problem is to formulate the conditions under which an inclusive pattern of author- 
ity and control can be achieved, and under which it breaks down. Let it be noted, further, 
that the term "world society" is usually taken to mean "all cultures on the globe," and is 
not restricted to an hypothetical pattern of one dominant (or even all-embracing) culture. 
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If humanity is to reach beyond the insecurities of the present to a 
more abundant, humane and sanguine future, policies must mediate 
between reality and aspiration. If the goal is the reduction of human 
destructiveness and the maximizing of values such as safety, prosperity 
and democracy, it is necessary to take fully into account the trends, 
however grim, of global politics and society.4 In the present discussion 
we are concerned with two often facilitating, often interfering trends, 
one conditioned by factors leading toward a bipolar structure of world 
politics, the other by factors making toward a homogeneous world 
culture combining science and democracy. 
I. THE BIPOLAR TREND IN WORLD POLITICS 
Two giant powers, the USA and the USSR, tend to confront one 
another on every significant issue in world affairs. Thus a bipolar 
system of world politics is taking the place of a pattern in which a few 
powers of approximately equal strength predominate (polypolarity).5 
The form of politics is altered, though the basic process is intact. 
Whether domestic or international, politics is a perpetual balancing 
of power, conducted according to prevailing expectations about how 
decisions are made and put into effect. In the arena of international 
affairs choice presupposes violence in the sense that whether anyone 
wants it or not, he must at least admit the likelihood of future wars 
and seditions. In the arena of internal politics the expectation that 
violence will be resorted to in making decisions recedes into the'back- 
ground, and the assumption prevails that differences will be settled 
by ballot. 
In the international arena the powers continually group and regroup 
in potentially hostile combinations. When four, five or more major 
powers predominate, every power can ally itself with every other. 
Under a bipolar system, on the contrary, this is out of the question, 
although intermediate powers continue to gravitate from one sphere 
into the other. 
A. The Alleged Transitional Character of Bipolar Systems 
For our purposes it is important to determine whether a two-power 
system is a "transition" toward "inevitable" unipolarity (by conquest 
or consent). Unfortunately exact historical parallels are missing. 
Although the globe has never presented the tragic spectacle with 
which we are today obsessed, past circumstances afford instructive, 
4. Concerning the goal values of democracy, see Lasswell and McDougal, Legal 
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest (1943) 52 YALE 
L.J.203. 
5. On tripolarity in recent world politics, see Fox, THE SUPER-POWERS (1944); on 
bipolarity, LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS FACES ECONOMICS (1945). 
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if partial, parallels. Large areas have in the past been cut off from 
significant contact with other regions, and these highly independent 
arenas have exhibited every conceivable pattern of power (unipolar, 
bipolar, polypolar, multipolar). 
In some cases a bipolar system has been superseded by a "universal" 
state or an "imperium." A universal state includes in one body politic 
all peoples who are in significant contact with one another. Examples 
are the Ts'in and Han Empire (221 B.C. to A.D. 172) in China, and 
in the New World the First Empire of the Mayas (about A.D. 300 
to 690). In these cases it is most exact to speak of an "imperium," 
meaning a state which proclaims general or even universal authority 
and exercises overwhelming supremacy throughout the "known world." 
(Order may be chronically disturbed at remote boundaries inhabited 
by an ambiguous fringe of tribes.) 
The record also reveals that bipolar systems do not invariably 
become unipolar. The two-state pattern has often broken into poly- 
polar or multipolar forms. In fourth, fifth and sixth century China 
(A.D.), power was divided between the Southern and Northern Dy- 
nasties, and during part of the time the control exercised by the two 
dynasties was so feeble that the actual picture was multipolar. When 
the Roman Empire broke up, parallel developments occurred, and the 
division into East and West was ultimately followed by extensive 
fragmentation. 
If a bipolar system is "inherently" unstable, it should pass away 
more quickly than other patterns. Although no generally accepted 
scholarly work satisfactorily classifies the patterns of power according 
to the number of years they have lasted in history, available evidence 
is enough to cast doubt upon the vulnerability of the two-state system. 
Unquestionably there has been a tendency to obscure the issue by 
exaggerating the permanence of one-state systems and to underplay 
bipolar structures. Arnold Toynbee, for instance, lists approximately 
twenty-three "universal states" which he alleges tend to endure four 
centuries each.6 Of the twenty-three, however, four are recorded as 
having lasted between two and three centuries 7 and eight for shorter 
periods.8 Of the eleven "four century" examples, four and possibly 
more cases are not relevant to our present inquiry (they are not in- 
6. The data are assembled in Table I of 6 TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY (1939). 
7. Hideyoshi's dictatorship and the Tokugawa Shogunate (1597-1868), Achaemenian 
Empire (c. 525-332 B.C.), the Manchu Empire (1644-1853), the Spanish Viceroyalty of 
New Spain (1521-1821). 
8. The Neo-Babylonian Empire (610-539 B.C.), the Mughal Raj (c. 1572-1707), 
the Guptan Empire (390-c. 475), the Mauryan Empire (1797-1814), the British Raj (1818-), 
the Napoleonic Empire (1797-1814), the Incaic Empire (c. 1430-1533), the Mongol Empire 
(1280-1351). 
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stances of unipolarity).9 Of the seven (or fewer) remaining states, the 
four century period cannot be accepted since generations are counted 
in which central supremacy was nearly zero.10 Non-unipolar periods 
are lumped into "Times of Trouble," and dates are not assigned to 
the bipolar or other patterns that prevailed at such times. 
The most likely conclusion touching upon the alleged instability of 
"bipolar" systems is that, like all systems of power in world politics, 
bipolarity is unstable. The relative degree of stability cannot be con- 
clusively determined in relation to unipolar systems. (But it is highly 
probable that polypolar or multipolar systems have prevailed longer 
than bi- or uni-polarity in the political arenas of history.) 
After all, one may ask, what is to be learned by counting up the 
dates on the tombstones of defunct patterns of world politics? No 
doubt the exercise enables us to dismiss glib remarks about "inevita- 
bility" or "instability," though in weighing future developments, the 
salient question is what factors sustain each system. Do the facts of 
comparative history make it possible to isolate the constellation of 
factors upon which each form of polarity depends? 
B. The Relation of Political Polarities to Society as a Whole 
The patterns of political polarity can for convenience be divided in 
two, according to the prevailing number of participants. When many 
small powers of about equal strength occupy an entire political arena, 
we speak of multipolarity. All the patterns that reduce the number 
of powers on a level of approximately equal strength can be called 
minimal power patterns (minimipolar patterns, for short). The mini- 
mipolar systems range all the way from one universal state or imperium 
to two giant powers, three super-powers, or a few great powers. 
A clue to the nature of the interdependence between the pattern of 
power in world politics and the structure of society is given by the 
history of Europe. After the dissolution of the Roman Empire, a 
multipolar system prevailed most of the time, and this gave way to the 
modern "national" state system (polypolarity) only after the rise of a 
few great centers of trade and thought. The new sub-centers shared a 
homogeneous culture of greater technological productivity than before. 
9. The Ottoman Empire (1372-1768), the Muscovite Empire (1478-1881), the Danu- 
bian Hapsburg Monarchy (1526-1918), the Arab Caliphate (640-969). Toynbee's "uni- 
versal state" is defined to include all who have a common civilization, rather than those 
who are in significant contact with one another. 
10. For instance, the troubles of third century Rome are severely minimized when 
Roman unity is alleged to continue without interruption. In some cases Toynbee gives 
weight (though on what basis is difficult to judge) to the facts of control as distinguished 
from nominal authority. Thus he dates the end of the Manchu Empire in China 1853, 
when Nanking was captured by the T'aip'ing insurgents, rather than 1912 when the dy- 
nasty was overthrown. 
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The spread of such an advanced culture ("advanced" be it noted in 
the defined sense of productivity) 1 carries as a corollary the widening 
of the gap between those who quickly acquire the new pattern and 
those who fail to do so. Hence a trend toward the sharing of a techni- 
cally advanced culture, when accompanied by resistances, is accom- 
panied by certain trends toward cultural disparity. 
Our available knowledge of political and cultural history appears to 
support the following proposition: Polarities of power are interdepend- 
ent with patterns of cultural homogeneity and disparity. 
What is implied in relation to polypolarity is that the growth of a 
limited number of dominant centers participating in an advanced 
culture favors the growth of a polypolar system of power. This is the 
general picture, referred to above, presented by the Europe in which 
"national" states became powerful.12 
Political bipolarity depends principally upon a bipolar pattern 
among the bearers of advanced culture. In the history of China, to 
recur to an example, a northern center of economic strength and 
cultural prestige has repeatedly stood over against a southern center, 
and political separatism has been nourished as a result.13 Similarly 
Upper and Lower Egypt were set off from one another at various 
times.14 Perhaps the most convincing indication of how bipolarity of 
power and of society are connected is the lack of political, economic 
and cognate forms of association between Russia and the surrounding 
world (despite the sharing of the modern technoscientific mode of 
production.) 15 
The relation between unipolar power and the common possession 
of a technically advanced culture is supported by much evidence. 
Toynbee, for instance, treats of history as a series of cultural wholes 
called civilizations, each of which becomes organized as a universal 
state when its distinctive features permeate a vast area.16 (Thus a 
high level of homogeneity with respect to an advanced culture paves 
the way for political unity, unless factors making for bipolarity inter- 
11. It is important that descriptive rather than preferential categories be used in 
classifying cultures. On the basic issues, see MALINOWSKI, A SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF CUL- 
TURE AND OTHER ESSAYS (1944); KROEBER, CONFIGURATIONS OF CULTURE GROWTH (1944). 
12. Especially useful is KULISCHER, ALLGEMEINE WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE D S 
MITTELALTERS UND DER NEUZEIT (1928-1929); also HEATON, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
EUROPE (1936). 
13. A convenient summary is LATOURETTE, THE CHINESE: THEIR HISTORY AND CUL- 
TURE (1934). 
14. BREASTED, A HISTORY OF EGYPT (1912). 
15. Russian development is given sympathetic treatment in SCHUMAN, SOVIET POLI- 
TICS AT HOME AND ABROAD (1946). Compare: LASERSON, RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN 
WORLD (1945). 
16. WISSLER, MAN AND CULTURE (1923) put forward the hypothesis that political 
authority tends to follow the zone of diffusion of material culture. 
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fere.) Once attained, a unipolar system appears in many cases to re- 
enforce the factors making for homogeneous culture. 
But disparities of culture can aid in thwarting the success of one- 
state systems, as when an empire expands beyond its homogeneous 
base and is unable to bring about a sufficient degree of homogeneity in 
the new area to endure. However, disparate elements do not always 
struggle successfully against an empire; on the contrary, they may 
be made relatively permanent by being excluded from a full share in 
the advanced culture (possibly being transformed into castes or de- 
pendent peoples).17 
The application of the foregoing analysis to the emerging picture of 
world affairs can be summarized as follows: 
1. To the extent that a common and technically advanced civiliza- 
tion girdles the globe, conditions favorable to a united world prevail, 
unless the bearers of the common civilization become segregated 
around two territorial poles of economic and general cultural strength. 
2. The continued existence of "primitive" peoples of disparate 
(technically backward) culture does not impede the possible formation 
of a world state by conquest. 
3. A unipolar world, once achieved, will not necessarily endure, 
unless many sub-centers of homogeneous culture are rather evenly 
distributed over the globe. 
4. A unipolar world does not necessarily involve the sharing of an 
advanced civilization; on the contrary, many groups may be perma- 
nently relegated into castes and dependent peoples. 
The non-quantitative character of these generalizations renders 
them difficult of successful application to the developing world situa- 
tion. We cannot specify, for instance, how much bipolarity of culture 
is necessary to sustain bipolarity of power, or how much homogeneity 
(or disparity) is essential to a unipolar system. 
C. The Nuclear Energy Crisis 
In estimating the future of bipolar patterns of power and society, 
and in outlining choices open to policymakers, it is imperative to 
evaluate the significance of recent advances in the release of nuclear 
energy (soon to be joined perhaps by spectacular developments in the 
field of cosmic radiation). It is generally agreed that in a few years 
the Soviet Union will have the "secret" of the bomb and that Russia 
may indeed improve upon the devices now in use.18 Further, it is 
17. Information on slavery and castes is available in such a compendium as SUMNER, 
KELLER, and DAVIE, THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY (1927). 
18. A convenient source of authoritative information is the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS (OF CHICAGO) (1945). See also, A REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 
OF ATOMIC ENERGY, DEP'T OF STATE PUBLICATION No. 2498 (1946); BRODIE (ed.), THE 
ABSOLUTE WEAPON: ATOMIC POWER AND WORLD ORDER (1946). 
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obvious that some anti-Russian elements desire to provoke a preven- 
tive war against the Soviet Union before the USSR achieves weapon 
parity. At the same time, there are tremendous official and popular 
pressures to set up adequate arrangements for the control of fissionable 
material. Three contingencies, therefore, must be inquired into: 
C.1 Assuming that the USA and the USSR possess weapon parity, 
though no adequate international control is set up, what pattern of 
power and society is likely to emerge? 
C.2 During the period of USA superiority in weapons, are there 
conditions under which the USA will undertake to organize the world 
by conquest, and with what results? 
C.3 If a world atomic energy authority is established, will the world 
state follow immediately? 
C.1 Weapon Parity (without agreement) 
The first contingency would occur if war is avoided during the period 
of American weapon superiority, and if no international control sys- 
tem is organized. It is not difficult to foresee the immediate effect of 
weapon parity upon power and society: rigorous bipolarity would 
prevail. Eyeing one another for evidence of hostile activity, contact 
between the Russian and American zones would be kept at a minimum. 
Anyone permitted to cross the borders would be looked upon as a 
probable spy and put under constant surveillance. Trade and invest- 
ment would be held down. Diplomatic relations would be tentative, 
suspicion-ridden, and meagre. Free communication-would be blacked 
out. 
The most extensive transformation would take place in the area 
controlled by the USA. Recognizing the peril of "split-second" attack, 
civilian officials would become progressively more dependent upon 
military authorities.l9 The Congress would multiply secret committee 
hearings, acquiesce in receiving less and less specific information about 
how the military proposes to spend appropriations, or how appropria- 
tions were spent during the last budgetary period. Fearing the com- 
munication of secrets to the enemy, freedom of scientific publication 
would disappear, and advanced teaching would be available only to 
students thoroughly'"checked" for loyalty. All scientists, teachers, 
and students would be under unremitting scrutiny by military and 
police intelligence services. In this apprehensive atmosphere full and 
frank criticism of constituted authority would be stifled. Personal 
denunciations, often based upon personal spite, would add a relatively 
new note to American life. 
American industry would become even more dependent upon mili- 
19. In Baruch's telling phrase to the UN: "The bomb does not wait upon debate. To 
delay may be to die." N. Y. Times, June 15, 1946, p. 4, col. 5. 
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tary approval for contracts, permission to use secret machines and 
processes, and access to raw material. Owners, executives and workers 
would be subject to security check by military and police authorities. 
Strikes and other suspensions of production would be interpreted as 
threats to national security. 
Mass unemployment would not be permitted to continue for any 
considerable time, since production losses and social unrest would 
undermine the ability of the nation to repel attack. The government 
would resort to whatever measures were deemed necessary to main- 
tain high levels of employment (relying at first upon the awarding of 
contracts and the advancing of credit).20 Every public and publicly 
supported private project would be coordinated with the advice (and 
eventually with the consent) of the military. 
In this way the "painless" extinction of free private enterprise would 
be brought about since the continuation of each business would depend 
upon the good will of governmental (military) officials. This would go 
along with the "painless" extinction of freedom of education, research, 
news and comment, public discussion and agitation. The government 
(increasingly controlled by military considerations and military offi- 
cials) would be the great news and knowledge source, and security 
regulations would guard and guide the dissemination of statements. 
The most enlightened industrial and political-military executives, 
aware of the danger to national morale attending such profound trans- 
formations in American life and the danger of subversion, would urge 
the application of modern scientific knowledge of human relations 21 
to the task of easing the conversion of America into a garrison state. 
Enlightened leaders would insist upon the continuous clarification of 
each group about its place in the picture. Enlightened executives 
would insist upon as much active participation as possible, seeking to 
devise substitutes for the traditional channel of public debate. (Even 
if largescale meetings were eventually prohibited, everyone might 
belong to a council in his residential block, office, shop, factory, or 
other work place. Membership in such a council could entitle him 
to receive otherwise confidential news and to send comments and 
20. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH; THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM 
1933-1944 (1944) has a compact review of Nazi methods of control. On the literature of 
theoretical and institutional comparisons, see the critical articles by Heimann in (1939) 
6 SOCIAL RESEARCH 88 and (1946) 13 id. at 103. 
21. Among many significant books are MAYO, THE HUMAN PROBLEMS OF AN INDUS- 
TRIAL CIVILIZATION (1933); BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1945); WHITE- 
HEAD, LEADERSHIP IN A FREE SOCIETY (1936); ROETHLISBERGER, MANAGEMENT AND 
MORALE (1941); METCALF and URWICK (eds.), DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE COLLECTED 
PAPERS OF MARY PARKER FOLLETT (1942); LEIGHTON, THE GOVERNING OF MEN (1945); 
APPLEBY, BIG DEMOCRACY (1945); MARX (ed.), PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW DE- 
MOCRACY (1940); URWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATION (1944). 
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recommendations through designated channels.) 22 Enlightened lead- 
ers would also insist upon applying the principle of appreciation, the 
adjustment of respect and of income in ways that stimulate maximum 
production. A major feature would be efforts to wipe out inequities 
in the treatment of America's "second-class citizens," the Negroes,23 
and certain other racial and religious groups. (In practice, the appli- 
cation of the foregoing principles of democratic action will be frus- 
trated to the extent that unenlightened executives and unliquidated 
bias remain.) 24 
Since totalitarian institutions are already established in the Russian 
zone, there would be fewer changes than in the American way of life. 
There would, of course, be recurring waves of discontent with the 
sacrifices entailed by incessant preparation for war. Undoubtedly this 
dissatisfaction would express itself in the typical defense-reactions of 
human beings exposed to continual stress-in slowness, clumsiness, 
carelessness, and illness.25 If war is deferred from year to year, Russian 
executives will find it expedient to give more material rewards to the 
labor force, raising the production of consumers' goods to a point 
judged compatible with the optimum production of war goods. 
It is not "inevitable" that the strain of living in the shadow of war 
will result in either side taking the offensive. War would be exceedingly 
dangerous to the ruling groups of both zones. The "first button" might 
wipe out the cities (and known vital points) of the enemy, but this 
would not spell victory since the military authorities of both powers 
would keep known vital spots of the other under constant surveillance, 
with machinery poised for instant retaliation. Even the most cynical 
leader-the more or less mythical homo politicus, the methodological 
twin of homo ceconomicus-would hesitate to run the risk, not only of 
losing his life, but of touching off a conflict in which both the USSR 
and the USA would largely destroy one another, leaving behind a 
power vacuum to be occupied by the Argentine, Iran, Mexico, and 
other surviving middle (or small) powers. "Instant war" would be 
much more likely to culminate in two Carthages, not one Rome (in 
pluripolarity, not unipolarity). 
If actual warfare is deferred from one year to the next, the expecta- 
22. No doubt the bureaucrat's "initialed" channel would be universalized while the 
open broadcast, newspaper and film would disappear. 
23. The scale of such problems is shown in MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944). 
24. The pattern of American culture has been characterized in a preliminary way by 
LYND, KNOWLEDGE FOR WHAT? (1939) and MEAD, AND KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY (1942). 
25. The basic personality dynamisms under conditions of boredom and stress: GILLES- 
PIE, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF WAR ON CITIZEN AND SOLDIER (1942); FARAGO (ed.), 
GERMAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (1941); MIRA, PSYCHIATRY IN WAR (1943); GRINKER 
and SPIEGEL, MEN UNDER STRESS (1945); CHISHOLM, THE SECOND WILLIAM ALANSON 
WHITE MEMORIAL LECTURES (1946). 
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tion of imminent violence will gradually recede into the background, 
save for occasional scares (perhaps engineered by the ruling groups to 
maintain internal discipline). Should the ruling groups in both zones 
succeed in maintaining a comparatively low level of internal tension 
(obviating any threat of revolution), eventually they may feel secure 
enough to expand the thin trickle of contact between the "two worlds." 
As the area of contact and confidence gradually extends, a movement 
toward "one world" would gradually get under way. (Institutions 
like the United Nations, however anemic today, would be available 
to implement a new trend toward world organization.) 
C.2 Preventive War 
Consider now the possibility that the USA will embark upon "pre- 
ventive" war during the period before Russia attains weapon parity. 
Up to the present the overwhelming sentiment of the American people 
is for peace and security. The American people have been a notable 
exception to cynical maxims about power and imperialism. Knowing 
that we possess a super-colossal weapon, we have not been transformed 
into a baying pack of world conquerors. On the contrary the scientists 
who produced the bomb, stricken of conscience, took the lead in de- 
manding internal control of nuclear fission by civilian, not military, 
authority and in insisting upon external control by a worldwide agency. 
American revulsion against the possibility of making affirmative use 
of the bomb was strengthened by the usual post-war withdrawal of 
interest from public to private affairs. Soldiers eager to get home, 
mothers and wives determined to hurry the soldiers home, politicians 
zealous to appease the veterans and their dependents, businessmen 
impatient to get out of government (and out of government controls) 
and back into business, farmers restless at price regulation, workers 
annoyed at wage ceilings-all these elements conjointly contributed 
to the swing from sacrifices on behalf of the public interest to the 
pursuit of immediate private advantage. The dominant sentiment was 
"the right to a private life" (to quote a remarkable slogan that cropped 
up among the garrison-ridden youth of Germany during the War). 
Strong as such factors were in the first year after V-day, they are 
of diminishing importance in relation to foreign policy. The march of 
events is fanning older sentiments into flame. Many American groups 
have been indoctrinated for years with anti-Russian bias, and although 
anti-Russian propaganda was in abeyance during the last years of the 
War, it has already reappeared with unabated vigor, taking advantage 
of the difficulties of an unconcluded peace. 
By themselves the anti-Russian elements in America are much too 
weak to bring about a crisis. Other groups would need to join. If 
during the next two or three years of negotiation for bomb control the 
American people come to regard Russia as the leading obstruction in 
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the path toward security, preventive action against Russia would not 
be out of the question. 
Before such a war could be started, the public would need to be 
fully alerted to the terrors of atomic war. They would need to believe 
that our government had struggled in good faith to obtain an effective 
agency of bomb control, and that Russia obstinately blocks a righteous 
plan. They would need to believe that Russian obduracy signifies that 
Russians are stalling for time to get bombs of their own in preparation 
for a surprise war to dominate the world (or, at least, to maintain an 
"intolerable" state of perpetual crisis in which our security of mind 
and our free institutions will perish). War would then appear to be a 
struggle, not against Russia, but against the enslavers of the Russian 
peoples, and the would-be enslavers of the peoples of the globe. War 
would not only be against something; it would be for something- 
"A War to Make the World Safe." 
From a strategic standpoint such a war would be no "thirty-minute" 
campaign. Enemy territory would need to be occupied as a follow-up 
on the bombing of enemy targets. The military forces of America and 
the allies of America would occupy all Siberia and all European Russia. 
It would not be possible, however, to annihilate the enemy's army 
without doing irreparable damage to civilians in friendly countries 
since the Red Army, deprived of bases in Russia, can overrun cities in 
Western Europe which we would be loath to destroy. 
At the end of active hostilities, the length of occupation would 
depend upon the policies to be put into effect. A relatively short period 
would suffice if our aim were to install machinery for the international 
control of nuclear energy. But during the war period, some American 
leaders would undoubtedly go beyond this limited objective and insist 
upon dismembering the USSR and restoring private capitalism (at 
least of international privately owned monopolies of mines, utilities 
and heavy industry). Such a program would be vehemently attacked 
by many other American leaders, who would assert that any attempt 
to disinter capitalism would transform the globe into a vast revolu- 
tionary-counter-revolutionary arena (in which American leads reac- 
tion). They would argue that any tendency to convert a "preventive" 
war into a "reactionary" crusade would boomerang, widening the split 
in American morale already stimulated by the war itself. 
It is uncertain which trend of policy would win, but the champions 
of minimum intervention would undoubtedly be handicapped by the 
anti-communist, anti-Russian, anti-socialist ideology prevalent during 
the war, and by repressive measures put into effect by military and 
police authorities. Also, the conquest of Russia would not necessarily 
guarantee American security. There would be perpetual rumours of 
anti-American conspiracies and of new, deadly and compact secret 
weapons. Our authorities would not only search for signs of subversive 
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activity throughout Russia; they would view every nation with suspi- 
cion, wondering whether Mexico City, Madrid, or Buenos Aires har- 
bored conspirative cells and secret laboratories devising new tools of 
death. Our leaders would be tempted to wage another, and yet another, 
"preventive" war in order to enlarge the area policed from Washington. 
The shock of the first "preventive" war (the one against Russia) 
would have opened great cleavages among the American people, where 
there are many persons for whom the Soviet Union is the beaconlight 
of humanity. The admirers of Russia are by no means exclusively 
recruited from racial and other "second class" citizens of the United 
States. In war genuine seditionists would shock the ruling elements 
of America into defensive repression, tending to transform the USA 
(and all dependent countries) into a garrison-prison state. Each suc- 
cessive war of "prevention" and each successive intimidation of a 
"doubtful" state would alienate a new group of Americans. Since the 
dissenters would be distributed widely throughout the nation, the 
ruling groups would generate inner tension and conflict. 
Perhaps the leaders of "Imperial America" would be able to protect 
themselves from assassins and revolutionists by ruthlessly applying 
modern scientific and technical methods (although atomic bombs, 
for instance, would be too unwieldy for most internal use). The loyalty 
of every individual could be put under the unremitting surveillance 
of military and police intelligence. Everyone could be required to 
undergo a regular medical and psychological examination (quarterly 
or annually) which would include tests to determine the presence or 
absence of "dangerous thoughts." (Each person could be put under 
the influence of drugs and questioned.) 26 Besides the application of 
scientific methods to enforce disclosure, other possibilities, long ago 
foreseen, may be adopted. Quite likely there are ways of incapacitating 
actual or suspected opponents, without depriving them of some use- 
fulness in production. The technical problem would be to destroy the 
higher cortical centers, while retaining enough coordination to allow 
for the performance of repetitive operations. In this way permanent 
caste difference (permanent disparities in level of culture) could be 
established inside the garrison-prison state.27 
There is the-possibility that at some point a revulsion against inces- 
sant violence will induce a spontaneous change of outlook among 
enough potent elements in society to reinstate the trend toward free- 
dom (much as the "witch burning" craze came to an end in colonial 
New England). 28 But it must be remembered that the absence of moral 
26. Relevant to detection problems are recent advances in "narcoanalysis." 
27. The present writer touched upon the possibilities of "Machiavelli, M.D." in 
WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935) 282. 
28. A case study: TAYLOR, THE WITCHCRAFT DELUSION IN COLONIAL CONNECTICUT, 
1647-1697 (1908). 
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revulsion is one of the dominant characteristics of our day. This 
callousness does not come primarily from the love of cruelty but rather 
from terror arising from the expectation of unlimited violence. Millions 
of otherwise decent citizens have experienced the possibility that men 
can behave like savages, and concluded that savagery must be met by 
savagery. In the interest of self-preservation, and especially of the 
preservation of loved ones and cherished ideals, they have met rifle 
with tank, tank with plane, plane with rocket in a tragic attempt at 
self-protection that spirals into the attrition of humanity. (The 
American government killed more civilians with more dispatch at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki than have ever been exterminated at one 
time in history. And there was no moral revulsion that threw out of 
office, and out of contact with decent human beings, every official who 
had any direct responsibility for the act.) 
That Americans will encounter psychological difficulties if they 
undertake to run a world imperium is true; yet too much importance 
is not to be attached to our dubious record of occupation in Germany.29 
A war for "World Government," for "World Security," for the "Con- 
trol of Atomic Energy," could have a more potent ideological basis 
than an anti-Nazi campaign. For many Americans World War II was 
a struggle to stop a sadistic gang of thugs, but it was done without 
enthusiasm, without an overwhelming sense of mission. Somehow 
the whole business seemed a side issue in a world where there are major 
issues. It was as though we were building a modern house and found a 
slimy pterodactyl disputing the premises. Although everybody takes a 
hand in slaying the beast, the enterprise would nevertheless be felt as a 
diversion from the constructive task of finishing the house. 
War to control atomic energy and to unite the world (under Ameri- 
can leadership) would generate enough enthusiasm in many quarters 
to carry over into the post-war era. Although such enthusiasm would 
be offset by the admirers of Russia, it is clear that war against the 
leaders of a country that blocks the path to world security would not 
appear to be entirely atavistic. On the contrary it would seem to many 
elements in this country and abroad as the breaking down of barriers 
to the world community. It could be argued, and few would deny the 
point, that atomic energy ought to explode group privacy in the modern 
world. No one is safe when any group withdraws from full, neighborly 
contact with the rest of the world. Not only is the self-isolated group 
prey to delusions about what the rest of the world is doing and think- 
ing, but the general anxiety level of everyone is increased through lack 
of reassuring contact. Hence it can be asserted that any government 
that cuts off its people from the free flow of information, travel and 
29. The connection between the complex pattern called "capacity for administration" 
and empire was emphasized by BROOKS ADAMS, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS 
(1913). 
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knowledge is a menace to world safety and sanity. Thus the govern- 
ment of Russia could be stigmatized as the jailor of the Russian peoples, 
transforming them into delusion-ridden instruments of the mad ambi- 
tion of a clique to rule the world. Hence the "War to Make the World 
Safe" is also a "War for World Neighborliness," a war for free speech, 
freedom of science, and freedom of travel. In such a perspective the 
conscience as well as the might of the American people, and of other 
peoples, could be directed against whatever regime tries to sabotage 
the effective control of fissionable material. 
C.3 International Control 
Let us now assume that an international agency is set up and is 
adequately staffed. Such an arrangement would substantially elimi- 
nate the probability of war in the visible future, and prepare the way 
for the further evolution of a worldwide civilization capable of sustain- 
ing an effective organization of the globe (without setting up a garrison- 
prison state). 
Although international tension would not be abolished, threats to 
the common peace could be promptly nullified. If anti-Russian ele- 
ments in America, or any other country, launch a hate campaign 
against the Soviet Union, alleging evasion, officials of the international 
control agency will be able to give the lie to ungrounded accusations. 
Not merely the friends of Russia, but all men of good will, will line up 
with control authorities and against inciters of hatred. 
It is not to be overlooked that an effective agency of the kind postu- 
lated here is something new under the sun, representing an important 
modification in the prevailing taboos of both Russia and America. 
American business men are sensitive to the disclosure of trade secrets 
to competitors and rivals, yet it will be essential for them to concede 
the right of international authorities to investigate any plausible re- 
port of undisclosed supplies or illegal use of material. On their side, 
Russian leaders are particularly allergic to the disclosure of intimate 
facts to foreigners, and the permission to establish a well-equipped 
bomb control authority inside the USSR would be a drastic innovation. 
We can be certain that the leaders of the USSR will have in mind 
the possibility that whatever authority is set up will learn that Russia 
is weak in fissionable material, in industrial "know how," and in facili- 
ties, and therefore that a war against Russia would stand an excellent 
chance of succeeding. If the USSR is really as weak as this, the rulers 
of the country will be strongly tempted to bluff and to sabotage the 
building of an adequate international authority. But this, as developed 
above, is to invite preventive war. 
If the Russians agree to and cooperate in a powerful worldwide 
atomic authority, they will remove practically all danger of a preven- 
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tive war against them. For this reason the Russian-hating elements 
outside Russia will do what they can to thwart an effective agreement. 
The Russian-haters will try in every way possible to cast suspicion 
upon the good faith of Russia, hoping to make the Soviet Union the 
scapegoat for protracted or stalled negotiations. The friends of Russia 
and, more importantly, the friends of American and world security as 
a whole, cannot be sure of nullifying this propaganda unless the Soviet 
government adopts the "propaganda of the deed" by giving emphatic 
assent to an atomic energy agreement and frank cooperation in putting 
final arrangements into effect.30 
The general result of the foregoing analysis is that if war does not 
occur before Russia has attained weapon parity (and no agreement is 
made for international control), the trend will continue for some time 
toward more rigid bipolarity, accompanied by chronic threat of war. 
In the end a unipolar consensus may gradually arise between the inde- 
pendent spheres. There is, however, danger of "preventive" war de- 
signed to forestall Russian parity, a danger which can best be obviated 
by the friends of world security if they have the help of an unequivocal 
and confidence-inspiring Russian policy toward the international con- 
trol of fissionable material. Such a control, once inaugurated, would 
greatly diminish both the likelihood of war and the rigidity of bipolar 
patterns of power and society. 
II. THE TREND TOWARD SCIENTIFIC AND DEMOCRATIC HOMOGENEITY 
Besides the trend toward bipolarity another conspicuous feature of 
world affairs is the trend toward a particular pattern of internal homo- 
geneity throughout the globe. 
A. As modern science and technology move towards universality, certain 
uniformities are imposed upon world attention, and attitudes are moulded 
in similar ways. 
Long a monopoly of Western Europe modem science and technology 
are spreading throughout the globe, although at present inhibited by 
the elements that are finding expression through the bipolar pattern of 
power. Certain consequences follow inexorably from the appearance 
of the "machine" (to use a condensed way of referring to the moder 
30. Public opinion polls provide important clues to American attitudes toward Russia. 
The most important finding is that during the years since national polls were put on a 
systematic basis, a relatively small percent of the population stays "pro" or "anti" during 
thick and thin. This shows how much importance must be attached to factors in the current 
environment of the community, rather than to crystallized predispositions. Polling data 
are regularly available in the PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY and in BRUNER, MANDATE FROM 
THE PEOPLE (1944); CANTRIL, GAUGING PUBLIC OPINION (1944). On the dynamics 
of opinion, see LAZARSFELD, BERELSON, and GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE: How THE 
VOTER MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (1944). 
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techno-scientific complex). The machine confers a sense of mastery. 
Even those who at first are mastered do not fail to observe and pres- 
ently to admire the impersonal strength and precision of mechanical, 
electrical, and other forms of energy applied to production. On the 
basis of direct experience, certain inferences sprout into belief and 
harden into faith, such as the speculation that if the brain of man can 
grasp and shape the bidden dynamics of Nature, man is capable of 
controling himself and his gadgets for the common good. This inference 
comes not from propaganda or pedagogy alone, or even principally; 
rather, it rises from indelible impressions left by association with man's 
handiwork. From glimpses of the possible develop demands that 
authority be induced or coerced to make whatever provision is neces- 
sary to share the fruits of knowledge with the "common man." How- 
ever supine the traditional outlook of any culture, contact with the 
machine touches off a dynamic approach to life.3' 
B. The Universal demands include equal opportunity to acquire, exer- 
cise, and reward socially useful skill. 
The first contact with the machine spelled frustration for millions of 
workers when complicated operations were subdivided into simple 
processes performed by contrivances ranged along an assembly line. 
Human operatives were constrained to adapt themselves to the metro- 
nome beat of machinery. 
This shredding of life into compartmentalized boredom is not in- 
herent in the application of mechanical, chemical and other forms of 
energy to production. The machine that brings frustration brings the 
possibility of escape into a larger life of self-expression. This is a 
matter of the hours spent at work and the degree of command over 
facilities in leisure time. Provided that the individual is able to eman- 
cipate himself from too many hours on the assembly line, and provided, 
further, that he commands a steady and substantial income, he can 
share the new freedom inaugurated by the unending novelties intro- 
duced by science and technology. 
Outworn ways of thinking have kept the creative diversity of the 
machine from being recognized by many executives and analysts, 
although the dynamic impact of technology has set in motion tendencies 
to correct early abuses.32 The demand for education, full employment, 
shorter hours, better housing, proper medical care, abundant recrea- 
tional facilities-all such demands give shape to the major social 
movements of moder history. Wherever the new knowledge has been 
31. A mine of information is SOMBART, DER PROLETARISCHE SOZIALISMUS, (1924). 
32. Economic and literary historians of early capitalism in England and elsewhere 
have kept alive a grossly exaggerated set of social images related to the machine. Modern 
studies of the sociology and psychology of the worker are steadily dissolving the older 
notions. 
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adapted to the reorganizing of production, the same chain of effect has 
been released-the same demand for education, for an income-produc- 
ing job, and for a respected place in society. Brief reminders: 
Skill Acquisition. Hand in hand with the expanding market has 
gone the spread of literacy, of systems of free public instruction, of 
compulsory school attendance, of prohibition of child labor, of ad- 
vanced and technical schools covering every phase of human 
knowledge, appealing to adult as well as youth and child.33 
Skill Exercise. The trend has been toward providing opportu- 
nities to make use of skill as well as to acquire it. The demand is 
exhibited in the watchword "Careers open to talent," in the name of 
which all manner of restrictions have been liquidated (against the 
employment of women, of racial and other minority groups). The 
struggle to iron out the business cyle and to provide emergency 
relief or employment are part of this trend.34 (In Socialist econo- 
mies the "right to work" is already written into basic law.) 35 
Skill Reward (Respect). To be "occupied" is not enough; a "job" 
implies a respected place in society, a continuous flow of self-respect 
as part of the reward of exercising a socially accepted skill. "Leaf 
raking" is not a true job, nor is compulsory labor. The modern 
protest against mass unemployment comes from the circumstance 
that being thrown out of a job is more than losing money income; it 
means the loss of a respected place in society.36 For many genera- 
tions the "dignity of work" has been a major slogan of all fighters 
against contempt for toil, against "aristocratic" disdain of measur- 
ing personality by what one can do, rather than by who one is. 
Skill Reward (Income). "Equal pay for equal work" is a protest 
against inequities in income that are rationalized in terms of sex, 
age, or minority status. The taxation of inheritance is one mani- 
festation of the demand to reduce or eliminate all forms of "un- 
earned" income-by gift, marriage, racketeering, gambling, mo- 
nopoly, exploitation, discovery.37 (The demand for a "minimum 
wage" is chiefly a means of maintaining basic human dignity- 
respect-rather than of accomplishing other purposes.)38 
33. A guide to the abundant data is provided by the ENCYC. Soc. SCIENCES (1930- 
1934) articles on the history of all forms of education. 
34. See MILLIS and MONTGOMERY, LABOR'S RISKS AND SOCIAL INSURANCE (1938). 
35. Article 118 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution of 1936 declares that all citizens have the 
"right to work"; article 119 recognizes "the right to rest and leisure," and subsequent 
articles deal with related matters. 
36. Articles on discrimination and upon racial and other social movements in the 
ENCYC. Soc. SCIENCES (1930-1934) are convenient guides. 
37. A manual of American experience with side-glances at the general trend is GROVES, 
FINANCING GOVERNMENT (1939). 
38. Note John A. Ryan's influential little classic, A LIVING WAGE (1906), expressing 
the progressive Catholic trend. 
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C. Another demand is for a share in decision making, in the control 
of skill. 
The rising self-consciousness of modem man has intensified conflicts 
centering around the making of decisions (in government, business, 
etc.). Historically, certain forms of despotism were swept away, and 
to a certain extent democracy in government has been accompanied 
by freedom in the market place.39 Where markets are private monop- 
olies, self-control is reduced or lost. In modern times the demand to 
share in the control of skill has so often been sacrificed to some other 
skill demand, like job security, that the trend toward skill control is 
less conclusive than toward equal opportunity to acquire, exercise and 
receive the rewards of skill. 
D. Homogeneous institutions are appearing throughout the world, 
bringing a new equilibrium of collectivizing-individualizing tendencies. 
As A. V. Dicey wrote many years ago,40 and as many others have 
written before and since, the trend of civilization may be said to be 
from "individualism" to "collectivism," a tendency most dramatically 
expressed in Russia. It is somewhat misleading to speak of the trend 
in doctrinal ("ism") terms since doctrines do not invariably foster the 
tendencies in the name of which they are formulated. "Individualism" 
for instance can be used to thwart the individuality of the worker for 
the benefit of the boss. We need to be on guard against assuming that 
the actual institutions of high capitalism did in fact provide the great- 
est net encouragement to individualizing tendencies that can be real- 
ized in human society. Many devices have already been invented 
which may, under appropriate conditions, improve on the period of 
capitalistic dominance. The new sciences of human relations are 
sufficiently advanced to stimulate the discovery of many new ways of 
sustaining creative tension between individualizing and collectivizing 
tendencies.41 Whether these potentialities can be realized depends, 
39. Where markets are genuinely competitive, skill control is relatively automatic, 
since executive, technician and laborer can share in the choices that affect them by changing 
employers. 
40. LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND 
DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1905). On actual developments, see LAWLEY, THE 
GROWTH OF COLLECTIVE ECONOMY (1938). 
41. Contrast with the sterile dogmatism of MISES, OMNIPOTENT GOVERNMENT (1944) 
and HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944), the problem-seeing, inventive approach of 
MERRIAM, SYSTEMATIC POLITICS (1945); RUML, TOMORROW'S BUSINESS (1945); BUNBURY, 
GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING MACHINERY (1938); MANNHEIM, MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN 
AGE OF RECONSTRUCTION (1940); LILIENTHAL, TVA; DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH (1944); 
GOLDEN and RUTTENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1942); THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, HOW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS (1942); GORDON, 
THE PUBLIC CORPORATION IN GREAT BRITAIN (1938); ROBSON (ed.), PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
(1937). 
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of course, upon the total context, and especially upon the level of inse- 
curity in world politics. 
E. Homogeneity of social structure does not necessarily carry with it 
either uniformity of doctrine or a single state. 
The present trend toward homogeneous institutions among the 
principal states and societies of the world is no new phenomenon. All 
the major peoples of Western Europe passed from "feudalism" to 
"capitalism" without adopting a standard doctrine or setting up an 
inclusive state. 
Indeed, one seemingly paradoxical detail of the process by which 
modem capitalism triumphed was the appearance of an outspoken 
revolutionary movement demanding uniformity of doctrine and world 
unity, by force if necessary. The French Revolution was one of the 
many avenues by which the general trend against "feudalism" and 
"autocracy" was instrumented. 
In general, we may say that a distinction is necessary between the 
world revolutionary pattern of an epoch and the pattern of the center, 
where new doctrines and elites emerge to power. The original pattern 
of the center is by no means to be confused with the general pattern of 
the epoch. The original pattern is not totally diffused throughout the 
political arena, and undergoes restrictive modifications from within 
and without, in the course of which the "common denominator" 
emerges, which is characteristic of the epoch as a whole. 
In our period the center of world revolutionary activity is unmis- 
takably Russia. But, as usual, the pattern of the epoch is not entirely 
clear to the contemporaries of the event. One conclusion, however, is 
probable. It is unlikely that the doctrine of the Russian Revolution is 
the doctrine of the epoch, or that the pattern of the epoch will coincide 
with the original pattern of the Russian Revolution. Already it is ap- 
parent that the doctrines and methods of the early period have been 
modified at home and abroad. But the forecast remains: the world is 
moving toward homogeneous social structure, regardless of whether 
political unipolarity is early or late.42 
42. On the meaning of current developments note such interpretations as the following: 
LENIN, IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1933); TROTSKY, THE PERMA- 
NENT REVOLUTION (1931) and THE REVOLUTION BETRAYED (1937); NOMAD, REBELS AND 
RENEGADES (1932); BENDA, THE GREAT BETRAYAL (Aldington's trans. 1928); BERDIAEV, 
THE END OF OUR TIME (1933); BORKENAU, SOCIALISM, NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL 
(1942); BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION (1941); DENNIS, THE DYNAMICS OF 
WAR AND REVOLUTION (1940); FRIEDMANN, WORLD REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
WEST (1942); LASSWELL and BLUMENSTOCK, WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA (1939). 
On structural changes in modern elites, see SOROKIN, SOCIAL MOBILITY (1927); MICHELS, 
UMSCHICHTUNGEN IN DEN HERRSCHENDEN KLASSEN NACH DEM KRIEGE (1934); Ross, 
PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION (1944); HOLCOMBE, THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS (1940); Gurvitch, Social Structure of Pre-War France (1943) 48 AM. J. Soc. 535; 
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F. In spite of doctrinal differences and political independence, unity 
of moral attitude is possible. 
Although the world is divided by sharp doctrinal disagreements, 
certain basic moral attitudes are held in common. Ever since the 
defeat of Nazi racialism, the ideology of every major power proclaims 
the dignity and worth of human personality. The significance of the 
trends toward a commonwealth of skill is that skill adjustments are 
indispensable means to the fulfilment of human personality, especially 
in an epoch of science and technology. Marxist and liberal traditions 
share one central theme, the aspiration toward a "free man's common- 
wealth" or a "free society." Both Marxism and liberalism are anti- 
aristocratic, anti-caste. They are individualistic in the sense that they 
insist that all men shall be respected for their common humanity. 
A factor in meliorating the present crisis in human affairs can be 
wider recognition of the common moral attitude that overrides detailed 
disputes about doctrine and about whether specific institutional 
devices do, in fact, implement the moral goal. It is too much to expect 
that this factor, or any simple combination of factors, will mitigate the 
present conflict and rescue humanity from suicide. But a common 
goal is a guide to men of good will everywhere and a practicable basis 
of appeal for common action before it is too late.43 
CONCLUSION 
Our review of world trends toward bipolarity and toward scientific 
and democratic homogeneity have shown how often they facilitate 
and how often they interfere with one another. A new level of techno- 
scientific culture must be widely shared before its full benefits can be 
attained. But the trend toward homogeneity arouses and intensifies 
restrictive factors which operate to limit, halt or reverse the even 
spread of such innovations as the modem techno-scientific pattern to 
many sub-centers throughout the world. These defensive adaptations 
have resulted not in creating universality of culture, but in concentrat- 
ing developments in certain zones. 
The aggregate impact of political considerations and conditions has 
been to limit the trend toward homogeneity and to drive it toward 
Timasheff, Vertical Social Mobility in Communist Society (1944) 50 AM. J. Soc. 9; BIEN- 
STOCK, SCHWARZ, and YUGOW, MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE 
(1944); Gerth, The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition (1940) 45 AM. J. Soc. 517. 
43. The possibility of agreement on moral objectives, while doctrinal postulates remain 
intact, is exemplified in the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Rela- 
tion to the Democratic Way of Life. See, in particular, FOURTH SYMPOSIUM, APPROACHES 
TO WORLD PEACE (ed. by Bryson, Finkelstein, and Maclver) (1944). Small loyalties are 
suffering attrition in the modern world. See especially FRIEDMANN, THE CRISIS OF THE 
NATIONAL STATE (1943); CARR, CONDITIONS OF PEACE (1942). On the ultimate need of a 
world organization see WEST, CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY (1945). 
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strengthening two polar centers. The overwhelming productive ca- 
pacity of the new techno-scientific pattern has heightened cultural 
disparity and fostered the tendency toward few rather than many 
states. First a few great powers, later three super-powers, and more 
recently two giant powers become the decisive poles affecting the world 
balancing process. Today we are witnessing a struggle between the 
elements expressing themselves through the bipolar pattern to protect 
the bipolar pattern against the unipolar potentials of the new energy 
developments. 
An attempt to impose world unipolarity by conquest at the present 
time would tend to halt the present trend toward homogeneity and to 
stereotype existing disparities and contradictions into relatively perma- 
nent castes. The elite that would saddle itself upon the world by con- 
quest would face recurring waves of sedition fed by the disparities and 
contradictions of present day humanity. In reply, the world elite 
would in all probability seek to defend itself by instituting a garrison- 
prison state, in which control would be in the hands of a relatively few 
specialists on violence (the world police). In such a caste society equal 
opportunity for the acquisition, exercise, and rewarding of socially 
useful skill would go by the board. 
If weapon parity is attained between the two great polar centers 
and no effective world control is instituted, the first effect will be to 
complete the creation of two non-penetrating worlds, thus rigidifying 
the present tentative bipolarity of power and culture. Chronic and 
intense fear of "push-button war" would contribute to the appearance 
of two garrison states, and fear of sedition would operate them like 
prison states. Should war be deferred from year to year, as the leaders 
recognize the danger of mutilating one another for the benefit of 
others, there would be a gradual revival of contact between the two 
garrison-prisons. Through the enlarging apertures would come revived 
exchange of news, knowledge, persons, products and agreements, thus 
reinstating the trend toward cultural homogeneity and political unifi- 
cation. 
If the destructive consequences of "preventive" war or of continuing 
acute fear of war are to be avoided, arrangements must be promptly 
completed for the control of our most devastating weapons. Such an 
arrangement would not signify the coming of the world state or the 
completion of a genuine world society. It would, however, be a de- 
cisive step toward the eventual integration of humanity, toward the 
triumph rather than the annihilation or the degradation of man. 
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